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Keeping Jailers from Keeping the Keys to the 
Courthouse: The Prison Litigation Reform Act’s 




 Prisons, jails, and other detention facilities in the United States are 
dangerously overcrowded, creating highly stressful environments for 
inmates and prison staff alike. As tensions run high, so do the occurrences 
of civil rights violations. In February of 2009, a three-judge panel in 
California tentatively ordered the release of approximately fifty-seven 
thousand inmates on the grounds that overcrowding in state prisons denied 
prisoners their right to mental health and medical treatment.2 In 2007, more 
than seventy thousand prisoners were sexually abused in the United States, 
according to Human Rights Watch.3 In 2006, the Orleans Parish Prison lost 
its accreditation by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care 
because of “service shortfalls” after Hurricane Katrina, and now it has one 
of the highest prison mortality rates in the country.4 
Subjecting a prisoner to cruel and unusual punishment is a violation of 
the Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.5 State prisoners can bring 
federal claims against a prison for maltreatment or inadequate conditions by 
bringing a claim under title 42 of the U.S. Code, Section 1983, for 
violations of their federal rights.6 Federal prisoners can bring a “Bivens” 
claim, which allows federal prisons to be sued in federal court for 
constitutional violations.7 Before a civil rights claim (or any claim pursuant 
to a federal statute) against the prison or prison officials can be filed in 
federal court, an inmate must first take his or her grievance through the 
prison’s own administrative remedy system.8 The administrative remedy 
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processes can be strict, difficult, and implemented inconsistently, resulting 
in an unfair tolling of statutes of limitation and civil rights violations 
committed with impunity. 
A legislative effort known as the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) 
purportedly sought to reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits filed by 
inmates.9 The PLRA was passed in 1996 with the stated goal of stemming 
the flow of frivolous lawsuits that some politicians felt were inundating the 
federal court system.10 Within the act lies an exhaustion requirement which 
requires inmates with grievances against an institution to exhaust all 
administrative remedies that the institution avails to them before they bring 
their suit to federal court.11 The PLRA has not made prisoner grievance 
systems more effective: while the number of lawsuits has in fact decreased 
following the passage of the PLRA, evidence suggests that meritorious and 
legitimate claims have been prevented from being raised right along with 
the frivolous ones. 
In November of 2007, in response to the many unintended consequences 
of the PLRA, the U.S. House of Representatives introduced the Prison 
Abuse Remedy Act (PARA) to make sorely needed amendments to several 
PLRA provisions, including the exhaustion requirement.12 Unfortunately, 
the bill died in the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism and 
Homeland Security with the close of the 110th Congressional Session.13 
It is imperative that Congress address the inadequacies of the PLRA by 
reintroducing PARA in the next Congressional Session. Congress should 
pass legislation requiring all prisons and jails to implement uniform 
grievance procedures or at least hold all prisons and jails to the same set of 
minimum standards that would ensure inmates with legitimate, meritorious 
claims access to the federal judicial system. This can be achieved either by 
expanding the requirements of the PLRA or by a separate action. 
Part I of this article will discuss the particulars of what the PLRA 
requires, its historical background, and its consequences. Part II addresses 
the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement and the consequences attributable to 
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that provision, such as the difficulties and limitations of administrative 
remedy procedures. Part III discusses what changes are needed and what 
efforts have or have not been made to implement those changes, including 
what led to the PARA’s rise and fall. Part IV analyzes the strengths and 
weaknesses of those recent efforts and proposes additional provisions for 
the PARA; and that, as an alternative, Congress can exercise its Section 
Five powers of the Fourteenth Amendment to implement blanket remedies 
to standardize administrative remedy procedures. 
II. THE PRISON LITIGATION REFORM ACT 
The PLRA lays out the federal guidelines for inmates to bring a federal 
claim against their prison. The legislative history of the PLRA (described in 
section A below) provides insight into the political and social context under 
which the act was passed; and thus, how the act’s strict and rigid 
requirements (described in section B below) were rationalized. Though the 
PLRA’s proponents have considered the legislation a success, section C 
examines its unintended consequences, most notably the obstacles it created 
for legitimate and meritorious claims to be heard. 
A. Historical Background of the PLRA 
Prior to the 1960s, prisoners were among those minority groups that 
traditionally lacked the political power to pursue the expansion and 
protection of constitutional rights.14 As a result of the successes of civil 
rights litigation in the 1960s under the Warren Court, the federal judiciary 
gained “broad equitable powers to undertake significant prison reform.”15 In 
1964, the Supreme Court case Cooper v. Pate16 expanded the availability of 
42 U.S.C. § 1983,17 allowing prison inmates to bring suit against prisons 
that deprived them of their constitutional rights.18 In Cooper, an inmate in 
the Illinois State Penitentiary was allowed to bring a cause of action against 
the state for the denial of equal treatment on the basis of religion.19 The 
inmate had been denied permission to buy certain religious publications, 
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and he alleged religious discrimination as a basis for his cause of action.20 
This case marked the beginning of an era of prison reform litigation.21 
Given the distrust in state and lower courts to protect criminal procedural 
civil rights, the federal judiciary expanded “individual liberties, including 
new criminal procedural protections, [but] also created more constitutional 
limitations on the states.”22 From the 1960s through the 1980s, prisoners 
and prisoners’ rights activists took advantage of the expanded availability of 
42 U.S.C. § 198323 by filing more lawsuits.24 However, beginning in the 
late 1970s, many others, including the Rehnquist Court, became displeased 
with the federal courts’ involvement with prison operations, particularly at 
the state level.25 
In 1980, Congress—signaling their own concern with the rising number 
of federal suits—enacted the Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act 
(CRIPA) as a means to reduce the number of federal civil rights claims 
brought by inmates.26 In order to achieve that end, the act required adult 
prison inmates in state facilities to exhaust their administrative remedies at 
the state level prior to bringing their claims in federal court.27 CRIPA 
authorized suits by prisoners and established several guidelines concerning 
the deprivation of their constitutional rights.28 
One CRIPA provision included the promulgation of voluntary “minimum 
standards for the development and implementation of a plain, speedy, and 
effective system for the resolution of grievances of adults confined in any 
jail, prison, or other correctional facility.”29 If the institution’s 
administrative remedies did not meet these minimum standards, however, 
the act did not require their exhaustion before the claims were brought to 
court.30 As such, the act also required that the U.S. Attorney General 
develop a procedure for the review and certification of the individual 
administrative remedy procedures (ARPs).31 
According to the U.S. Department of Justice’s Bureau of Justice 
Statistics, the number of federal civil rights claims filed by state prisoners 
continued to rise, despite the intended purpose of CRIPA.32 Indeed, the 
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period between 1980 and 1996—the year in which the PLRA was signed 
into law by President Clinton—petitions filed by federal and state inmates 
in U.S. district courts nearly tripled from 23,230 to 68,235.33 
This increase in federal civil rights claims filed by inmates was primarily 
attributed “to the increase in the [s]tate prison population.”34 The total U.S. 
prison population—state and federal—increased by more than three-and-a-
half times within this same time period according to the Justice 
Department’s study (from 329,821 in 1980, to 1,181,919 in 1996).35 In the 
years following the passage of CRIPA, the United States also saw the 
construction of approximately one thousand new prisons and jails.36 Despite 
the boom, prisons and jails still became increasingly overcrowded during 
that time.37 
Overcrowded facilities are known to be dangerous and degrading,38 so it 
is understandable that the potential for grievances and lawsuits would be 
significantly increased as stress and frustration grows within the prisons. 
Given the fact that the number of civil rights claims after CRIPA’s 
enactment remained proportionate to the prison population, it is arguable 
whether CRIPA was ineffective at achieving its intended goal of reducing 
the number of federal civil rights claims. 
Regardless of whether CRIPA was actually successful, in 1995, Congress 
sought yet again to reduce the number of federal claims filed by prison 
inmates, attributing the high volume to the ease with which prisoners were 
able to file lawsuits. Congress was seemingly very concerned with the 
federal judicial resources spent on frivolous lawsuits and the federal 
judiciary’s micromanagement of prisons.39 The 103rd Congress passed the 
PLRA while neglecting to confront the causes of legitimate civil rights 
petitions or the causes of rising incarceration levels. 
In April 1996, the PLRA was passed as part of the Omnibus Consolidated 
Rescissions and Appropriations Act, an emergency appropriations bill that 
ended the federal government budget standoff in 1996.40 The legislature 
attempted to strike the balance between reducing the number of frivolous 
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lawsuits filed by prisoners and maintaining the ability of prisoners to file 
meritorious cases.41 In the debates preceding the passage of the bill, a 
supporter of the PLRA, Senator Orrin Hatch, stressed that the high number 
of frivolous lawsuits filed by inmates impeded the courts’ ability to consider 
meritorious claims, and that he did “not want to prevent inmates from 
raising legitimate claims.”42 A co-sponsor of the bill, Senator Strom 
Thurmond, claimed that the act would allow the filing of meritorious claims 
but that a judge would have “broader discretion to prevent frivolous and 
malicious lawsuits filed by prison inmates.”43 These concerns came together 
to form the basis of the PLRA’s requirements. 
B. Requirements of the PLRA 
The PLRA established several hurdles for inmates wishing to bring 
federal lawsuits. In addition to the exhaustion requirement, the PLRA 
requires that an inmate show physical injury before damages “for mental or 
emotional injury suffered while in custody” may be recovered.44 Inmates 
that bring an action, but have had at least three previous actions dismissed 
“for being frivolous, malicious, or for failing to state a claim for which 
relief may be granted,” must pay the entire filing fee.45 Indigent filers are 
also required to pay a portion of the filing fee.46 One provision of the PLRA 
threatens filers of malicious or harassing suits with the revocation of earned 
good time credit;47 while another simply limits the courts’ power to grant 
injunctive relief to prisoners, regardless of whether the suit is frivolous.48 
Civil rights groups have described the PLRA as “extremely anti-prisoner, 
and designed to limit a prisoner’s access to the federal courts.”49 Compared 
with the CRIPA50—the PLRA’s predecessor51—the provisions are highly 
burdensome and discouraging to prisoners who have grievances and 
legitimate complaints. While the stated intention of the act was to filter out 
the number of frivolous lawsuits filed from within prison walls, legitimate 
lawsuits have been filtered out as well.52 
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C. Effects and Consequences of the PLRA 
The PLRA’s requirements have made filing a complaint more expensive, 
more time-consuming, and more dangerous for prisoners.53 As such, a 
number of unintended consequences have resulted, including the inability of 
cases concerning, rape, assault, and religious rights violations to get filed in 
federal court.54 At best, it seems disingenuous that these are the types of 
cases that Congress truly envisioned would get more attention in lieu of the 
frivolous claims. 
The provisions in the PLRA, not contained in the CRIPA, that are mainly 
responsible for producing the unintended consequences are the physical 
injury requirement, the “three-strikes” provision, and the exhaustion 
requirement. Whereas the CRIPA only applied to convicted adults in any 
correctional facility,55 the PLRA expanded the affected population to “any 
person incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted 
of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law 
or the terms and conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or 
diversionary program.”56 As a result, the provisions of the PLRA also 
constrain juvenile detainees, pre-trial detainees, and federal prisoners. 
1. The Physical Injury Requirement 
42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(e)—one of the statutes amended by the 
PLRA—requires that an inmate must show that a physical injury has been 
suffered before the inmate can recover damages for a claim of mental or 
emotional distress. This has caused several problems.57 Because the statute 
fails to define what constitutes a physical injury, many courts are split on 
the issue. Some courts have held that the physical injury requirement 
includes all injuries, including non-physical constitutional rights 
violations;58 still other courts have ruled that those rights are non-
compensable.59 Some courts have even ruled that a sexual assault is not a 
physical injury,60 a significant concern considering the prevalence of sexual 
abuse in prisons.61 
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2. The Three Strikes Provision 
The “three strikes” provision (often referred to as the “frequent filer 
provision”) limits the number of times an inmate can file a federal case in a 
given amount of time. A consequence is that some inmates who are prone to 
frequent abuse, either from other inmates or prison staff, are barred from 
filing legitimate claims within the given amount of time.62 Sometimes, a 
failure to exhaust an administrative remedy as a result of some minor 
technical error will count as a dismissal, and thus count against an inmate’s 
permitted number of claims.63 
3. The Exhaustion Requirement 
Because the exhaustion requirement seems to exacerbate the 
consequences of the two aforementioned requirements (the physical injury 
requirement and the three strikes provision) of the PLRA, it is the main 
focus of this article. The consequences of the exhaustion requirement will 
be covered in Part II. 
III. SPECIFIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE PLRA’S EXHAUSTION 
REQUIREMENT 
Many key consequences of the PLRA stem from its exhaustion 
requirement. 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(e) states that inmates must first 
exhaust all administrative remedies that are available to them before they 
may bring their claim to federal court.64 Prior to the U.S. Supreme Court’s 
recent rulings in Porter v. Nussell, Booth v. Churner, and Woodford v. Ngo, 
there was much controversy and many circuit court splits as to the meaning 
of the exhaustion requirement and what actually constituted exhaustion.65 
Some have argued that this was the result of poorly written and hastily 
passed legislation, evidenced by its method of passage in an omnibus 
appropriations bill.66 Regardless, the Supreme Court has provided some 
clarity, even though some new questions have been raised as a result, and 
some lingering questions remain unanswered. 
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A. Porter v. Nussel and Booth v. Churner 
While “prison conditions” went undefined in the PLRA, leaving 
ambiguity as to what inmates could sue for, the Supreme Court has held that 
the term “prison conditions” refers to everything that takes place within a 
prison, from inadequate living conditions to excessive force.67 In Porter v. 
Nussel, Nussel, an inmate in a Connecticut prison, brought a federal suit 
against the institution for a violation of his constitutional right to be free 
from cruel and unusual punishment, as he was severely beaten by prison 
guards, following a pattern of harassment.68 However, he did not file a 
grievance with the prison prior to his federal court filing, as required by the 
PLRA when suing for inadequate “prison conditions” under Section 1983.69 
The Court held “that the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement applies to all 
inmate suits about prison life, whether they involve general circumstances 
or particular episodes, and whether they allege excessive force or some 
other wrong.”70 
The Supreme Court also held that in order to comply with the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement, an inmate must exhaust the prison’s grievance 
system, regardless of whether the grievance system offers the type of relief 
the inmate is seeking.71 In Booth v. Churner, Booth was a prisoner in a 
Pennsylvania state prison, and he sued for an Eighth Amendment violation 
of excessive force.72 Booth sued for monetary damages in federal court as 
the Pennsylvania grievance system did not provide monetary remedies.73 
However, the Court explained that it is the administrative process itself that 
is to be exhausted, not merely the relief offered by individual grievance 
processes.74 As a result, even though most grievance systems do not allow 
for relief in the form of damages, a prisoner must file a grievance and await 
the inevitable denial before filing a claim in federal court.75 
B. Woodford v. Ngo 
In 2007, the Supreme Court ruled that the exhaustion requirement was 
not met “by filing an untimely or otherwise procedurally defective 
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administrative grievance or appeal.”76 Before Woodford v. Ngo, the federal 
appellate circuits were split as to whether an administrative grievance filed 
after a prison’s set deadline, and consequently rejected by the prison’s 
administration, was considered an exhaustion of an administrative remedy.77 
In Woodford, the exhaustion requirement was challenged by an inmate 
serving a life sentence in a California prison.78 The inmate was segregated 
from the general population for over one month “as punishment for alleged 
‘inappropriate activity’ with volunteer Catholic priests.”79 Upon his release 
from segregation, Ngo was prohibited from participating in “evening 
fellowship and bible study sessions” and from corresponding with a former 
chapel volunteer.80 He filed a grievance six months later, arguing that his 
punishment was ongoing and continuous, but his grievance and subsequent 
appeal were denied because the original grievance was not filed within 
fifteen days of the “event or decision being appealed.”81 He then filed his 
claim in district court, but it was dismissed for failure to exhaust his 
administrative remedies; the Ninth Circuit subsequently reversed.82 The 
Supreme Court reversed and remanded the Ninth Circuit decision, holding 
“that proper exhaustion of administrative remedies is necessary.”83 
The prison argued that the exhaustion requirement meant “proper 
exhaustion,” i.e., “that a prisoner must complete the administrative review 
process in accordance with the applicable procedural rules, including 
deadlines, as a precondition to bringing suit in federal court.”84 The Court 
agreed that this interpretation was necessary “because no adjudicative 
system can function effectively without imposing some orderly structure on 
the course of its proceedings.”85 The Court focused on the wording of the 
PLRA when it stated that the exhaustion provision will not allow a judicial 
remedy to “be sought or obtained unless, until, or before certain other 
remedies are exhausted.”86 
Indeed, because of the use of the word “until,” the Court deemed the 
wording of the PLRA closer to the wording of the traditional doctrine of 
administrative exhaustion.87 Appealing to the well-established “Doctrine of 
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Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies,”88 which provides “that no one is 
entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened injury until the 
prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted,”89 the Court 
explained that the PLRA exhaustion provision means using “all steps that 
the agency holds out, and doing so properly (so that the agency addresses 
the issues on the merits).”90 The Court explained that the only time they can 
“topple over administrative decisions” is when the decision was made in 
error and that the error was appropriately objected to according to the 
administrative rules.91 Under a plain reading, “42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) 
strongly suggests that the PLRA uses the term ‘exhausted’ to mean what the 
term means in administrative law, where exhaustion means proper 
exhaustion. Section 1997e(a) refers to ‘such administrative remedies as are 
available,’ and thus points to the doctrine of exhaustion in administrative 
law.”92 
The ruling in Woodford has very serious implications. If a grievant 
misses a deadline to file a grievance, at any level of the administrative 
process—including appeals—and the prison administration refuses to 
review the grievance on those grounds, the grievance will be dismissed, and 
the remedies will not be deemed exhausted. Consequently, the grievant with 
a legitimate meritorious claim will be left without an avenue for relief. The 
ruling in Woodford has placed a significant burden on prisoners in states 
whose ARPs make it extremely difficult for a grievant to meet his or her 
deadlines. The next subsection will address how the difficulty in securing 
relief varies among the states. 
C. Administrative Remedy Procedures 
In Woodford, the Court stated that “[c]orrections officials concerned 
about maintaining order in their institutions have a reason for creating and 
retaining grievance systems that provide—and that are perceived by 
prisoners as providing—a meaningful opportunity for prisoners to raise 
meritorious grievances.”93 Indeed, one of the reasons for the exhaustion 
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requirement is to give the prison the opportunity to address the grievance on 
their own before they get haled into court.94 Notwithstanding these reasons, 
administrative remedies are often difficult to follow. 
Most ARPs have a three-step process. The first step requires a prisoner to 
make an effort to informally resolve the matter. The second step, if the first 
was unsuccessful and the prisoner can provide such proof, requires the 
prisoner to formally appeal.95 The third step usually involves another formal 
appeal.96 The deadlines and requirements for each step vary among different 
facilities.97 
ARPs exist in every level and type of detention facility. The Federal 
Bureau of Prisons (BOP) sets the guidelines for ARPs that are to be 
implemented at both government-run prisons and private prisons contracted 
to house federal prisoners.98 At the state and local level, ARP guidelines are 
usually set by the state and implemented by the institutions that run the 
facilities.99 Such facilities include state penitentiaries, city and county jails, 
and juvenile detention centers. 
1. The Federal Administrative Remedy Policy 
As many of the challenges to the exhaustion requirement stem from state 
ARPs, some of the PLRA’s critics have held the federal system to be a 
model for individual state procedures. The BOP system is said to be 
designed to handle inmate grievances more efficiently, somewhat fairly, and 
with a higher level of investigation.100 It is intended to be applied 
consistently throughout all federal prisons regardless of the state.101 
The BOP’s ARP for federal prisons requires an informal attempt by the 
aggrieved prisoner to resolve the issue before requesting a formal 
administrative remedy.102 Both the informal and formal processes are 
established by the wardens of each facility, both of which must be 
completed within twenty days of the event that is the basis of the request.103 
The BOP’s ARP allows for extensions under four circumstances: (1) the 
inmate must have been in-transit and thus unable to obtain the necessary 
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documents; (2) the inmate must have been physically incapable of preparing 
a request (though assistance to illiterate, disabled, or non-English literate 
inmates is to be ensured by the warden);104 (3) the inmate had to wait an 
unusually long time for a response to an informal resolution attempt; or (4) 
if the prison staff had verified a claim, the response to a request for copies 
was delayed.105 Only one claim (and any related issues) may be placed on a 
single grievance form; noncompliance will result in rejection. The facilities 
are required to provide responses and reasonable time extensions for 
resubmission in writing, when resubmission is allowed. Decisions not 
allowing resubmission may also be appealed.106 
There are two levels of formal appeals. First, appeals from a warden’s 
decision are due to the regional director’s office within twenty days of the 
warden’s dated response; and second, appeals from the regional director’s 
office are due to the general counsel’s office within thirty days of that dated 
response.107 
While the BOP system is preferable to many state procedures, it is not 
without faults. If one counts the initial filing as an appeal to the informal 
attempt at resolution, then there are a total of three appeals for the inmate to 
pursue, and therefore three deadlines to meet (the margin of error for 
technical mistakes or not meeting deadlines is logically increased with 
every additional step, possibly resulting in dismissal and thus, an inability to 
exhaust all administrative remedies).108 The deadline for the initial appeal is 
twenty days.109 However, if the inmate is initially confident that the 
informal attempt will be successful, but is subsequently unsatisfied with the 
result, the time in which to prepare a formal complaint (or first appeal) is 
shortened. Not only does this put the grievant at a disadvantage, it deems 
the informal process futile if the grievant decides to pursue and prepare for 
both avenues simultaneously. Although the rules allow for a waiver of the 
informal attempt if the issue is demonstrably sensitive (i.e., if the inmate’s 
safety would be compromised) and is filed at a level above the warden,110 or 
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if the warden allows for an exception after a request, the grievant still incurs 
more procedural requirements (and thus an increased margin of error).111 
2. Variance of Administrative Remedy Policies within the Ninth Circuit 
A brief look at two states in the Ninth Judicial Circuit provides a 
snapshot of the differences between various state ARPs. California, the state 
with the highest incarceration rate in the nation, has a policy that is very 
similar to the BOP’s system.112 While the BOP requires the formal 
grievance to be filed within twenty days of the subject event, the California 
system requires it to be filed within fifteen working days.113 Because 
California requires the same procedure to be used for filing grievance 
systems as it does for challenging disciplinary infractions, there are two 
appellate procedures after the initial formal grievance is filed, resulting in a 
total of four levels.114 Although the informal level requires confronting the 
staff involved in the inmate’s grievance, it may be waived if it “may result 
in a threat to the appellant’s safety or cause other serious and irreparable 
harm.”115 
In addition to the higher standard that California requires in order to 
bypass the informal level, the same concerns raised by the BOP system are 
also raised by the California system, (i.e., that more appellate levels invite 
more mistakes and informal grievances are discouraging). Also, as far as 
necessary conditions required for informal resolutions are concerned, even 
if inmates do not sense imminent danger when they complete the informal 
level, they may still feel discouraged to take that initial step, for fear of 
ridicule.116 
Washington provides a slightly longer deadline for the initial complaint 
to be filed—twenty business days.117 Though it does not have an informal 
remedy requirement, it does have three appellate processes.118 The deadline 
to file these appellate processes is only two days.119 
While California and Washington have some advantages and 
disadvantages for inmates when compared with the BOP (i.e., different 
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numbers of appeal levels and different timelines for reporting and appeals), 
both states allow the PLRA to be applied differently within the same circuit. 
The U.S. Supreme Court has attempted to interpret the exhaustion 
requirement with limited success. 
D. Jones v. Bock 
A recent, unanimous U.S. Supreme Court decision has allowed some 
leniency and fairness with regard to different interpretations of the 
exhaustion requirement. In Jones v. Bock, three petitioners from separate 
correctional facilities in Michigan challenged three of the Sixth Circuit’s 
then-existing interpretations of the PLRA: specifically, whether a prisoner 
must prove exhaustion in a complaint, whether the prisoner must name 
defendants in a complaint not named in the grievance, and whether failure 
to exhaust a single issue is grounds to dismiss an entire complaint.120 
First, the Court ruled that inmates do not necessarily prove exhaustion in 
a complaint under the PLRA because Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
(FRCP) 8(a) only requires “‘a short and plain statement of the claim’ in a 
complaint, Rule 8(c) identifies a non-exhaustive list of affirmative defenses 
that must be pleaded in response” and “that courts typically regard 
exhaustion as an affirmative defense.”121 Thus, the Court stated that the 
PLRA does not require “a prisoner to allege and demonstrate exhaustion in 
his complaint.”122 
The second issue addressed by the Jones court was whether, under the 
PLRA, all defendants named in the complaint must have been identified in 
the original grievance. The Court reasoned that:  
Compliance with prison grievance procedures . . . is all that is 
required by the PLRA to ‘properly exhaust.’ The level of detail 
necessary in a grievance to comply with the grievance procedures 
will vary from system to system and claim to claim, but it is the 
prison’s requirements, and not the PLRA, that define the 
boundaries of proper exhaustion.123  
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Therefore, because Michigan’s ARP did not require the identification of 
particular prison officials, it was not required under the PLRA, per se.124 
The third issue was whether all claims presented in a complaint must be 
exhausted at the administrative level before bringing them in a single 
federal action in compliance with PLRA. The Court explained that “[t]here 
is no reason [that] failure to exhaust on one [claim] necessarily affects any 
other.”125 Thus, only those claims that have not been exhausted pursuant to 
the exhaustion requirement may be dismissed; “if a complaint contains both 
good and bad claims, the court proceeds with the good and leaves the 
bad.”126 
The Jones decision clarifies ambiguity within the PLRA and promotes 
consistency in its implementation among the various states. However, when 
we consider the Court’s ruling in regard to naming individual officials in a 
grievance claim and the power that prison officials have in determining 
what will constitute a proper federal constitutional claim, the Court’s 
“hands off” attitude toward prison administration becomes clear.127 If a 
prison’s ARP contains certain requirements for a grievance to be exhausted, 
then the ease or difficulty with which a prisoner can bring a federal claim is 
dependant upon those requirements. If a particular prison administration 
sets unreasonable or arbitrary requirements that a given prisoner is unable to 
meet, then it is because of that prison’s administration that the prisoner is 
unable to bring a claim. This issue will be addressed further in Part III. 
E. Juvenile Detention Centers 
The PLRA’s exhaustion requirement carries heightened consideration 
when we consider the fact that the PLRA, as opposed to its predecessor, the 
CRIPA, applies to incarcerated juveniles.128 According to a 2007 report, 
more than 100,000 juveniles were incarcerated in the United States, either 
in juvenile detention centers or adult facilities.129 In 2005 and 2006, there 
were close to seventeen allegations of sexual violence made for every 1,000 
youths held in juvenile detention.130 Female youths are most at risk of 
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experiencing sexual abuse by staff.131 Part of the problem is that in the 
United States, male officers are allowed to work in all areas of female 
detention centers.132 These statistics suggest that juvenile detainees face 
constitutional violations as well. It is worth noting that while the PLRA 
applies to juvenile correction centers, juvenile lawsuits were not the 
intended target in the PLRA’s goal of reducing frivolous lawsuits.133 In fact, 
two years after the PLRA was enacted, no more than a dozen federal claims 
challenged the conditions of juvenile institutions in 1998.134 This is 
evidence that, while juvenile detainees are vulnerable to constitutional 
violations, they are not likely to seek a legal remedy. 
Abuses in juvenile detention centers go beyond sexual abuse, and the 
PLRA can be a barrier to getting those issues resolved. A quintessential 
example of how the exhaustion requirement is a detriment to juveniles is the 
case of Minix v. Paezera.135 This case was brought by a juvenile in custody 
in the state of Indiana and his mother. During his incarceration, the young 
man was beaten several times by other inmates. He once suffered a seizure 
as a result but was denied help by facility staff. The youth was also raped, 
and was forced to witness another inmate being raped. He feared retaliation 
from the facility’s staff, as they were known to arrange fights and beatings 
among the inmates, so he did not file a grievance—which the state of 
Indiana requires to be filed within forty-eight hours of the event.136 The 
federal claim against the prison officers, officials, and the Indiana 
Department of Corrections was dismissed for failure to exhaust all 
administrative remedies.137 
Presumably, juveniles have even more difficulty reporting abuse because 
they are less sophisticated and legally savvy than adult detainees. They do 
not even have a constitutional right to a law library,138 so even more 
competent juveniles are afforded less access to legal information. An 
exhaustion requirement is yet another unnecessary hurdle for juvenile 
detainees to access justice. The PLRA needs to be amended in order to give 
340 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
juveniles the ability to challenge abuses and conditions without fear of 
reprisal and stigma. 
IV. THE NEED FOR REFORM 
A. The PLRA’s Deceiving Success Rates and Other Statistics 
It stands to reason that if the PLRA had improved the quality of the cases 
that were filed in federal court, the success rate of plaintiffs would also go 
up.139 This has not been the case. The number of civil rights cases filed fell 
from 41,679 in 1995 to 25,504 in 2000.140 “[B]etween 2000 and 2004, the 
rate of filing remained relatively constant, dropping only slightly to 
approximately 16 suits per 1000 inmates.”141 In 1995, plaintiffs who filed 
federal civil rights claims were 13 percent successful.142 In 2002, six years 
after the PLRA was passed, plaintiffs were only 10 percent successful.143 
Thus, six years after the PLRA was passed, an inmate who filed a civil 
rights claim was less likely to succeed. 
In the immediate years after the PLRA was passed, a 2003 study found 
that while inmate plaintiffs were winning a large portion of their cases that 
were taken to trial, fewer cases were going to trial, and fewer cases were 
settling, suggesting more dismissals.144 
Although the drop in the number of suits filed confirms that the PLRA 
has been successful in reducing the number of federal claims, the decrease 
in success rates among inmates and the increase in dismissals also suggest 
that the rate of frivolous federal claims has remained the same. Comparing 
the current incarceration levels to levels when the PLRA was passed, it 
follows that more abuses would tend to occur, thus giving rise to more 
successful meritorious claims. 
The PLRA was enacted in a different era with different statistics, and this 
country has since experienced a significant rise in incarceration levels. The 
prison population was 1,125,874 in 1995, growing to 1,381,892 in 2000.145  
In the beginning of 2008, there were 1,596,127 inmates held in either state 
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or federal prisons, combined with 723,131 held in local jails, for a total of 
2,319,258 people incarcerated in the United States.146 To illustrate the 
disturbing rate of rising incarceration levels, the Texas prison population 
increased by 300 percent over the course of twenty years, between 1985 and 
2005.147 Florida’s inmate population has increased from 53,000 to 97,000 
between 1993 and 2007 and is estimated to reach 125,000 by 2013.148 
Sources vary on whether overcrowding in prisons is on the decline. One 
source estimated that while state prisons were running at 114 percent of 
their operational capacity in 1999, in 2004 they were operating at 99 
percent.149 Another source, however, reported that in 2004, state prisons 
were running at 115 percent of their capacity.150 
Despite the difference in estimates, it is reasonable to infer that with the 
current levels of incarceration, and the resultant overcrowding and 
understaffing, there should be a proportionate rise in meritorious civil rights 
claims.151 Overcrowded conditions can lead to violence and abuse.152  As it 
stands, “prisons are struggling mightily to keep a full complement of 
officers on staff.”153 If correctional officers are in less of a position to 
provide appropriate care, there should be a rise in meritorious and 
successful lawsuits. 
B. The Need to Reform Administrative Remedy Procedures 
There is no limit to the complexity or difficulty that an incarcerating 
authority can place on an inmate via an internal grievance procedure.154 
Prisoners’ rights advocates have explained that the exhaustion requirement 
“obstructs rather than incentivizes constitutional oversight of prison 
conditions. It strongly encourages prison authorities to come up with ever 
higher procedural hurdles in order to foreclose subsequent litigation.”155 It 
is understood that correctional facilities would prefer to have an initial 
opportunity to take corrective action when an inmate files a complaint.156 
While it is in their interest to avoid litigation, an effective grievance system 
also provides a source of information to make improvements to the facility, 
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promote accountability and lawfulness, provide an opportunity for inmates 
to be heard, and reduce tension.157 Unfortunately, the exhaustion 
requirement encourages incarcerating authorities to immunize themselves 
from liability instead of taking it as an opportunity to address concerns and 
improve conditions.158 The exhaustion requirement is an arbitrary 
obstruction to constitutional claims that should be heard before an impartial 
court.159 
States have been known to alter their ARPs in order to serve as a hurdle 
that inmates must overcome in order to bring a claim in federal court.160 
After the ruling in Jones v. Bock, the State of Illinois altered its ARP to 
require that “prisoners name all of the individuals involved in the incident” 
when filing a grievance.161 Prior to the ruling, the Seventh Circuit had 
dismissed the State’s defense of non-exhaustion because Illinois’s ARP did 
not specify a requirement for that level of detail at the time.162 Such a 
change in procedure suggests that any state, not just Illinois, is able to create 
barriers to limit access to courts, regardless of the merits of the case. As 
individual states are responsible for the administration of state prisons and 
thus liable for tort actions against prisons, such a technical nuance allows a 
state to quickly dispose of a case, and thus end its exposure to litigation. 
Although a requirement to name all defendants involved in an incident 
may not seem like a difficult hurdle, it is entirely plausible for an inmate to 
be kept from filing a grievance in the first place if he or she cannot discover 
the name of those involved in his or her claim until after the deadline for the 
grievance has passed. Normally, a plaintiff would have up until the normal 
statute of limitations to discover the names of unknown defendants. Such 
plaintiffs would even be able to amend a complaint in order to add the 
names of defendants identifiable during discovery. But because of an extra 
requirement in a state’s grievance procedure, the state potentially hinders 
such inmates from filing a claim in court. 
Filing is also complicated by the recurrent pattern “of threats and 
retaliation against prisoners who file grievances and complaints.”163 
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Recently, a complaint against a Michigan officer for physical threats and 
assault was dismissed because the inmate failed to discuss the issue with the 
officer, as required by the grievance system.164 Inmates are often required to 
submit their grievance forms to, or attempt to informally resolve their 
grievance with, the same guards that have abused them. This would 
invariably discourage inmates from filing grievances.165 As an example of 
intimidation, the staff at the Orange County Jail in Santa Ana, California, 
has been known to refer to a grievance form as a “snivel sheet” and 
routinely rejects them automatically for improper completion.166 
Improper and untimely completion may occur for several reasons, 
including incompetence. According to a study in 1998, “[a]bout 70 percent 
of the prison inmates in the United States are illiterate.”167 Another study in 
2003 showed, “forty percent of state prison inmates, twenty-seven percent 
of federal inmates, and forty-seven percent of inmates in local jails have 
failed to complete high school or its equivalent, compared with only about 
eighteen percent of the general population.”168 It has been estimated that 
approximately 200,000 incarcerated individuals in the United States “suffer 
from a serious mental illness,”169 although that count may be higher 
considering a 1999 estimate that there were “at least 350,000 mentally ill 
people in jail and prison on any given day.”170 While many grievance 
procedures ensure assistance to this population, and indeed, they may have 
a right to such assistance,171 there are instances where this service is denied. 
It is therefore very difficult for particularly vulnerable inmates to exhaust 
the grievance system, at least within the timeframe required by many of the 
current systems. 
To illustrate that this is a real problem, consider the case in which a non-
English literate inmate filed a grievance in Spanish, alleging that he had not 
been placed in English classes as he had requested.172 His grievance was 
denied, albeit with the permission to resubmit the grievance in English.173 In 
another instance, an inmate in Pennsylvania submitted a grievance form 
replete with spelling and grammatical errors. The grievance was denied, and 
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he was asked to resubmit the grievance with corrected spelling and 
punctuation.174 
Some prisoners’ rights advocates have suggested that the “exhaustion 
provision should not be eliminated, but rather amended, to require simply 
that prisoners’ claims be presented to corrections officials prior to court 
filing” (i.e., a notification requirement).175 A notification of a lawsuit to 
prison officials would certainly be one way to deal with the problems 
presented by the exhaustion requirement, but a more direct and effective 
way would be to amend the administrative remedies themselves. 
Proponents of the PLRA might argue that a notification requirement 
would not serve the reasons behind the exhaustion requirement. The 
majority in Woodford stated that the purpose of the exhaustion requirement 
is to allow an incarcerating authority the first opportunity to address its own 
internal problems and to encourage compliance with individual grievance 
processes. Furthermore, the Court stated that the exhaustion requirement is 
designed to promote efficiency by discouraging frivolous cases.176 
Unfortunately, all of these desired outcomes are attained at the expense of 
the prisoner’s constitutional rights and are arguably better achieved with a 
notification approach. 
Assuming that a grievance procedure is effective and fair, a notification 
would allow the facility the first opportunity to address its unique problem, 
and it would certainly promote the resolution of meritorious cases, in that 
prisons would get the first chance at resolving frivolous claims, and 
meritorious ones would advance. However, if an aggrieved inmate were 
merely required to notify the prison of an impending lawsuit, there would 
be no incentive to comply with the administrative procedures. 
If the reduction of frivolous lawsuits, with an ultimate goal of allocating 
more resources toward meritorious ones, were the intention of the PLRA, 
then it should not matter if meritorious claims are compliant with the ARPs. 
The Court in Woodford points out that state institutions have the most to 
benefit from handling grievances first because “it is difficult to imagine an 
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activity in which a State has a stronger interest, or one that is more 
intricately bound up with state laws, regulations, and procedures, than the 
administration of its prisons.”177 However, there seems to be no benefit to 
subjecting meritorious claims to ARP compliance. 
C. The Prison Abuse Remedies Act 
On November 7, 2007, U.S. Representatives Robert Scott and John 
Conyers introduced the Prison Abuse Remedies Act (H.R. 4109) (PARA) 
“[t]o provide for the redress of prison abuses.”178 A hearing was held on 
November 8, 2007, concerning the problems of the PLRA; this was the first 
such hearing in the eleven years since the PLRA was enacted.179 The PARA 
might have been introduced as a response to Woodford and Jones, but more 
than likely it was born out of the recent call for reform by groups that were 
not typically considered prisoners’ rights advocates, such as the American 
Bar Association (ABA).180 
The PARA sought to revise the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement, or 
U.S.C. 1997e(a). Section 3 of the PARA entitled “Staying of Nonfrivolous 
Civil Actions to Permit Resolution Through Administrative Processes,” 
reads as follows: 
Subsection (a) of section 7 of the Civil Rights of 
Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. 1997e(a)) is amended to 
read as follows: 
(a) Administrative Remedies - 
(1) PRESENTATION - No claim with respect to prison 
conditions under section 1979 of the Revised statutes (42 
U.S.C. 1983), or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility 
shall be adjudicated except under section 1915A(b) of 
title 28, United States Code, until the claim has been 
presented for consideration to officials of the facility in 
which the claim arose. Such Presentation satisfies the 
requirement of this paragraph if it provides prison 
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officials of the facility in which the claim arose with 
reasonable notice of the prisoner’s claim, and if it occurs 
within the generally applicable limitation period for filing 
suit. 
(2) STAY - If a claim included in a complaint has not 
been presented as required by paragraph (1), and the court 
does not dismiss the claim under section 1915A(b) of title 
28, United States Code, the court shall stay the action for 
a period not to exceed 90 days and shall direct prison 
officials to consider the relevant claim or claims through 
such administrative process as they deem appropriate. 
However, the court shall not stay the action if the court 
determines that the prisoner is in danger of immediate 
harm. 
(3) PROCEEDING - Upon the expiration of the stay 
under paragraph (2), the court shall proceed with the 
action except to the extent the court is notified by the 
parties that it has been resolved. 181 
PARA’s changes to the PLRA were based on suggestions given by 
Professor Margo Schlanger and the Coalition to Stop Abuse and Violence 
Everywhere (SAVE), a prisoners’ rights group dedicated to the prevention 
of violence.182 The SAVE Coalition and Schlanger, a prominent prisoners’ 
rights scholar, suggested that a presentation requirement, as described in 
paragraph (1) of the PARA, be substituted for the exhaustion 
requirement.183 In addition, the ABA suggested that a stay be granted to 
prisoners who have filed a lawsuit but who have not yet exhausted the 
administrative remedies in order to give the inmate and the institution an 
opportunity to resolve the conflict without running the risk of having a 
meritorious case dismissed for non-exhaustion. The ABA also pointed out 
in its resolution that the Woodford decision, which engrafted a “procedural-
default rule . . . onto the exhaustion requirement[,] imposes a statute of 
limitations on many prisoners that ranges from a few days to a few 
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weeks.”184 However, the ABA noted that even 120 days may not be enough 
for a victim to realize that they have a civil rights claim.185 
Although the PARA proposed a ninety day stay, as opposed to the 
minimal 120 day stay suggested by the ABA, the PARA was a step in the 
direction of giving all inmates, regardless of what state they are in, an equal 
amount of time to pursue a federal claim pursuant to a federal statute.186 
The PARA did not proceed beyond the committee stage. Additional 
hearings were held on April 22, 2008, but that was the last congressional 
action that took place in regard to the PARA.187 When the 111th Congress 
meets, it is imperative that the PARA get reintroduced and passed. Prisoners 
tend to be left out of the political debate, especially when there is a call to 
be “tough on crime” by the electorate. Prisoners and prisoner advocates 
should not have to endure another eleven years of prison abuse that is 
fostered through the PLRA and its respective case law. 
Though the PARA did not pass in 2008, it can be improved. As the 
dissent in Woodford points out, the majority did not answer the question as 
to what constitutes a “meaningful” grievance system.188 As discussed in 
detail in Part IV below, regardless of whether the exhaustion requirement is 
amended (but more importantly if it is not), there needs to be some sort of 
standardization of the various ARPs. If grievance systems are to efficiently 
resolve meritorious claims and successfully dispose of frivolous ones, 
Congress should pass legislation that will require all correctional facilities’ 
grievance procedures to comply with a system that ensures that they will 
function effectively.189 If Section 3 of the PARA successfully passes, then it 
will be easier to pass legislation that enforces a minimum set of 
requirements. And to avoid the opportunity for states to opt out of 
compliance, Part IV describes an avenue that will further incentivize 
compliance with the standardization of grievance systems. 
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V. AVENUES TO REFORM THE NATION’S ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDY 
PROCEDURES 
A. Advancement of the ABA’s Suggested Proposals 
In February of 2007, the chair of the American Bar Association’s 
Criminal Justice Section wrote a report in support of a resolution to amend 
the PLRA.190 He suggested that possible “steps the federal government can 
take to foster the just resolution of prisoners’ complaints by correctional 
grievance systems . . . might include linking federal funding to specified 
improvements in grievance processes [and] technical assistance from the 
federal government to improve those processes. . . .”191 
In the spirit of the ABA’s recommendation, Congress should use its 
federal enforcement power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
of the Constitution to reinstate the five minimum standards required of 
internal prison grievance systems under CRIPA: (1) a decentralized 
advisement board; (2) time limits for responses to inmate grievances; (3) 
prioritization of certain grievances; (4) safeguards against reprisal for filing 
grievances; and (5) independent review of grievance dispositions.192 
The ABA letter further opined that grievance systems should “maximize 
their potential to solve problems, address prisoner’s legitimate concerns, 
and remedy violations of prisoner’s legal rights. . . .”193 These three criteria 
existed to some extent prior to the PLRA. First, under CRIPA, grievance 
systems maximized their problem-solving potential in that all correctional 
facilities were required to provide for a decentralized advisory role of both 
staff and inmates in “the formulation, implementation, and operation of 
[grievance] system[s].”194 
Second, the legitimate concerns of inmates would certainly be addressed 
because CRIPA mandated time limitations for written responses to 
grievances, as well as mandated that specific reasons be given for the 
decisions in the written responses.195 
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Third, the remaining three standards under CRIPA ensured the remedy 
for legal rights violations. CRIPA stated that grievances that would result in 
“substantial risk of personal injury” by the grievant if delayed were to be 
given priority processing.196 Safeguards against reprisal were required for a 
grievant if the resolution of the grievance posed a risk of such reprisal.197 
Most importantly, CRIPA required an independent review of all grievance 
dispositions by a party who was “not under control or under direct 
supervision of the institution.”198 
These five recommended standards would serve as a sufficient basis for a 
system of federally mandated grievance systems proposed herein. However, 
if legislation is needed in lieu of the PARA’s presentation requirement, i.e., 
if Section 1997e(a) does not get amended, four more recommended 
standards could create a viable alternative. 
First, the specific time limit for written responses should be regulated to 
leave enough time to meet the statute of limitations to file a suit in federal 
court. As described above, a detention facility’s response to a grievance is 
required to be in writing in most instances, yet the time limit for a prison to 
provide this response varies from state to state. Under this proposal, a 
sufficient time limit for a response to an administrative appeal will be 
before one third of the normal statute of limitations has elapsed. This would 
give the aggrieved inmate a sufficient amount of time to prepare a federal 
case should the response not provide an adequate remedy. 
Second, the number of appeal levels within the individual grievance 
systems should be limited to one. This would serve two purposes: it would 
reduce the level of complexity for the aggrieved inmate, and it would 
reduce the bureaucracy and costs to the states. The more levels of appeals 
an aggrieved inmate is forced to comply with increases that inmate’s 
chances of missing a deadline and making a procedural error, especially for 
the undereducated, mentally ill, or illiterate. Also, numerous appeals take 
more resources. Because an individual state would be more familiar with its 
own system and allocation of funds, it would be up to the state to determine 
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who should be the appellate authority, e.g., the warden, regional director, 
state correction department, etc. 
Third, any requirement that calls for an inmate to pursue informal 
procedures to remedy the problem should be made optional. There are two 
reasons for this as well: an inmate may find it more convenient, efficient, or 
expedient to deal with the problem informally, yet another inmate may not 
feel safe or comfortable doing so. To enforce a mandatory informal attempt 
to remedy a situation as a default procedure—which thereby makes a 
bypass of this step an exception that would require additional paperwork—
unnecessarily increases the danger of retaliation toward an aggrieved 
inmate. 
Finally, in an effort to ensure compliance, an aggrieved inmate should be 
allowed to bring a cause of action against the state for the violation of any 
of the minimum standard requirements. 
B. Constitutional Considerations 
This proposed legislation is likely to be controversial. First, the 
regulation of state prisons is traditionally a power that has been reserved for 
the states.199 CRIPA originally made their requirements optional and would 
allow an affirmative defense of failure to exhaust all administrative 
remedies as a reward for compliance. Under this proposal, the standards 
would not be optional. Second, because this proposed law would abrogate 
sovereign state immunity from being sued in federal court, Eleventh 
Amendment issues must also be taken into account. Should Congress take 
these steps, it would stand to reason that some states would challenge the 
statute on the grounds that a provision allowing a civil remedy to a prisoner 
against that state would violate their sovereign immunity under the Eleventh 
Amendment. In order to make sure these issues pass constitutional muster, 
it will be necessary to determine whether Congress acted within its rights 
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. 
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The Supreme Court has declared that Section 5 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment is “a positive grant of legislative power authorizing Congress 
to exercise its discretion in determining the need for and nature of 
legislation to secure Fourteenth Amendment guarantees.”200 A prisoner’s 
access to court is certainly a Fourteenth Amendment guarantee;201 it is well 
established that “prisoners have a constitutional right of access to the 
courts,”202 and of course, the equal protection clause provides that “[n]o 
state shall . . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws.”203 
This new legislation would aim to prevent and remedy constitutional 
violations by state governments (i.e., to protect the right of prisoners to 
bring their legitimate and meritorious claims in federal court without the 
interference of prison officials). If passed, this law would eliminate the 
possibility that a valid claim would be prevented from being heard by a 
federal court because certain administrative procedures, procedures that are 
separate from the judicial process, were not followed. According to the 
Supreme Court, “[b]ecause prisoners retain . . . [their First Amendment 
right to petition the government for a redress of grievances], ‘when a prison 
regulation or practice offends a fundamental constitutional guarantee, 
federal courts will discharge their duty to protect constitutional rights.’”204 
Congress, by enacting these minimum requirements, would enhance a 
constitutional right already recognized and defined by the Supreme Court. 
A prison’s refusal to comply with such requirements does not serve a 
legitimate penological interest.205 Such a rational basis for review would be 
the lowest standard that a prison would have to meet in order for them to 
justify such violations. Indeed, such laws would further the safety and 
integrity of prisons, without taking away too much of their traditional 
authority as the legislation would allow discretion in determining the best 
way to meet all of the minimal requirements. 
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1. Remedial and Preventive Measure 
In order to enact this law and exercise its power under the enforcement 
clause it must be shown “[that] Congress had evidence of a pattern of 
constitutional violations on the part of the States in this area.”206 Congress 
will need to find that prison administrations have pervasively denied court 
access to inmates with valid claims. Part III above provides empirical and 
statistical evidence that state governments, through prison administrations, 
have not only violated prisoners’ rights to access courts, but that all states 
maintain the ability to do so. As such, Congress will have shown that the 
new law seeks to remedy and prevent constitutional violations. 
However, as “preventive rules are sometimes appropriate remedial 
measures,” appropriateness “must be considered in light of the evil 
presented.”207 Congress would then have to show “a congruence between 
the means used and the ends to be achieved.”208 Ultimately, it is important 
that preventive measures are not unwarranted responses to other, lesser 
harms.209 
2. Congruent and Proportional 
A constitutional violation under these circumstances would occur when 
inmates, for all intents and purposes, are kept from filing legitimate suits. 
Some argue that prisoners are not barred from bringing meritorious claims 
under the PLRA, “provided that the prisoners fully proceed through the 
prison’s internal grievance system and abide by its deadlines.”210 However, 
as mentioned earlier, current ARP guidelines are established by the states, 
and the actual ARPs are developed by the incarcerating authorities, thus 
allowing those entities to make the rules concerning who has access to 
federal courts to protect their constitutional rights.211 Under the PLRA, 
prisons are encouraged “to come up with high procedural hurdles, and to 
refuse to consider the merits of serious grievances, in order to best preserve 
a defense of non-exhaustion.”212 
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As mentioned previously, there have been many instances where an 
inmate failed to exhaust all administrative remedies as required by the 
PLRA and was therefore prevented from bringing a federal claim against a 
prison.213 As unjust and inappropriate a system that would perpetuate such a 
phenomenon may be, merely showing that inmates are notoriously late in 
filing grievances, or are reluctant to obtain available assistance to correctly 
complete the requisite forms, will not convincingly illustrate that the prison 
is denying the inmates access to courts. But when inadequate timelines and 
arbitrary procedures affect the ability of incompetent aggrieved inmates to 
successfully complete a grievance, the denial of rights by prison officials is 
highlighted. 
The legislation recommended here is, therefore, congruent and 
proportional. First, the requirement that a final written response to an 
aggrieved inmate’s claim leave a substantial amount of time to meet the 
statute of limitations is necessary, as state guidelines may allow a claim to 
go unanswered for long periods of time. If the final response arrives and it 
is unsatisfactory to the aggrieved inmate, the inmate may not have enough 
time to prepare a timely complaint. The first proposal would eliminate the 
possibility of this occurrence. 
Second, because of the high volume of undereducated, illiterate, and 
mentally ill inmates, an excess number of appeals at the administrative level 
may become unnecessarily and detrimentally burdensome. Keeping the 
number of appeals to a minimum reduces the chances of inmates with 
legitimate claims from making clerical errors. 
Third, voluntary informal grievances protect vulnerable inmates from 
further abuse or retaliation if they are allowed to bypass that step. The risk 
of harassment could dissuade inmates from pursuing a valid claim. The 
showing of immediate danger, which many systems require, appears to be 
an arbitrary obstruction. 
Finally, a claim for damages is needed to deter state governments from 
choosing not to comply with federal standards, thereby diminishing the 
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possibility that state governments would deny inmates their constitutional 
right to access the courts. The federal government may use the distribution 
of funds to the states in order to induce compliance, but if a state chooses to 
decline, then the door for violations is left open. 
The sort of obstruction described in Part III above is prevalent throughout 
the nation’s prisons and jails. States and correctional facilities have an 
incentive to alter their regulations at their own discretion in order to deny an 
individual a constitutional right to access the courts. Because the nation’s 
institutions run the risk of such misconduct, and the laws proposed herein 
have applied to all states in the past, via the CRIPA, enacting the proposed 
legislation is appropriate. This proposed law would give all inmates a fair 
chance of suing state officials pursuant to federal statutes. Congress is 
authorized to allow individuals to bring suit against the state in federal court 
for violation of these acts because such a proposal would be a congruent 
and proportional solution to the problems it is intended to prevent. In 
addition, the looming threat of lawsuits would force correctional facilities to 
comply. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Despite the stated intentions of its original supporters, the PLRA has 
proved to be unsuccessful in its efforts to reduce the number of frivolous 
lawsuits filed by prisoners. Although it was claimed that the PLRA would 
not hinder the ability of inmates to bring meritorious claims into federal 
court, and would in fact increase judicial resources so that meritorious 
claims would receive more attention, evidence has shown otherwise. The 
PLRA has had a sweeping effect of preventing many cases, regardless of 
their merits, from being litigated in federal court. 
Among the top provisions responsible for this harsh effect is the PLRA’s 
exhaustion requirement, which requires the exhaustion of prison grievance 
systems before inmates can bring their claims to court. If the promotion of 
justice and civil rights was the intention of the PLRA, it is irrelevant 
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whether prisoners have complied with ARPs. The exhaustion requirement is 
simply an arbitrary obstruction to inmates’ access to the courts. 
Although members of the House of Representatives introduced an 
amendment to the PLRA in 2008, the attempt was unsuccessful. The PARA 
would have taken away the exhaustion requirement and replaced it with a 
requirement that would simply allow grievant prisoners to notify the 
appropriate prison officials of their intended lawsuit. Such a notification 
would encourage prison officials to rectify the situation complained of, and 
thus give them an opportunity to prevent litigation; however, it could render 
the grievance process ineffective. Regardless, if the PLRA were intended to 
promote justice and civil rights, it is irrelevant whether prisoners have 
complied with the ARPs. The exhaustion requirement does little more than 
keep legitimately aggrieved inmates from entering a federal courthouse. As 
an alternative, I have recommended that Congress exercise its Section 5 
powers under the Fourteenth Amendment to enact legislation that would set 
minimum requirements for all grievance systems and provide a legal 
remedy against the sovereign states. This would ensure that prisoners have 
access to federal courts and that all prisoners enjoy the freedom to raise 
their concerns without fear of reprisal when they feel that other 
constitutional rights have been violated. The time for reform is now. 
In 2003, Congress passed the Prison Rape Elimination Act, affirming its 
“duty to protect incarcerated individuals from sexual abuse.”214 The Act 
required the establishment of a national commission to develop standards 
for correctional facilities nationwide that would set up a process to 
eliminate prison rape.215 The National Prison Rape Elimination Commission 
(NPREC) released a report in June 2009 in which it stated that the PLRA 
“has compromised the regulatory role of the courts and the ability of 
incarcerated victims of sexual abuse to seek justice in court.”216 The 
NPREC explicitly cited the exhaustion requirement as one of the 
contributing factors to this breakdown of justice.217 As such, the NPREC 
has recommended a standard under which “an inmate will have been 
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deemed to have exhausted all administrative remedies as of ninety days 
after a report of sexual abuse has been made.”218 The standard allows 
reports to be made at any time after the incident of abuse.219 It also allows 
the ninety days to be reduced to forty-eight hours in cases where an inmate 
petitions the court for an immediate injunction seeking protection from 
imminent harm.220 
Should the U.S. Attorney General approve these standards in 2010, the 
U.S. government will have recognized that prisoners face enormous 
obstacles in accessing justice. This will create the right political climate for 
advocates to push for further changes to the PLRA and the exhaustion 
requirement. “With the number of adults just shy of 230 million,” we are 
reaching a point in our history when traditional punitive measures and 
prison administration must change.221 
 
                                                 
1 Seattle Univ. School of Law, Juris Doctor Candidate, degree expected May 2010. 
2 Michael Rothfeld, Judges Back a One-Third Reduction in State Prison Population, 
L.A. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2009, available at http://www.latimes.com/news/local/la-me-
prisons10-2009feb10,0,815133.story. 
3 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, U.S.: FEDERAL STATISTICS SHOW WIDESPREAD PRISON 
RAPE (Dec. 15, 2007), http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/12/15/us-federal-statistics-
show-widespread-prison-rape?. 
4 Laura Maggi, Death Rate at Orleans Parish Prison Ranks Near Top, THE TIMES-
PICAYUNE, Feb. 7, 2009, available at http://www.nola.com/news/index.ssf/2009/02/ 
death_rate_at_orleans_parish_p.html. 
5 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. (“Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”). 
6 CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS & NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, THE JAILHOUSE LAWYER’S 
HANDBOOK: HOW TO BRING A FEDERAL LAWSUIT TO CHALLENGE VIOLATIONS OF 
YOUR RIGHTS IN PRISON, 1, 9 (4th ed. 2003) [hereinafter CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS & 
NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD]. 
7 Id. at 2, 8 (citing Bivens v. Six Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971)). 
8 42 U.S.C. 1997e(a) (2006) (“No action shall be brought with respect to prison 
conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a prisoner 
confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative 
remedies as are available are exhausted.”). 
9 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–34 (1996) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of the U.S.C.).  
Keeping Jailers from Keeping the Keys to the Courthouse 357 




12 Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2007, H.R. 4109, 110th Cong. (2007). 
13 Id. 
14 Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, Developments in the Law, The Prison Litigation Reform Act and 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act: Implications for Federal District 
Judges, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1846, 1848–49 n.9 (2002). 
15 Id. at 1849. 
16 Cooper v. Pate, 378 U.S. 546 (1964). 
17 42 U.S.C. 1983 (1996) (“Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects . . . 
any . . . person . . . to the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable. . . .”). 
18 Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 14, at 1848–49 n.9. 
19 Cooper, 378 U.S. at 546. 
20 Id. at 546 (citing Pierce v. LaVelle, 293 F.2d 233 (holding that cases regarding the 
discipline of inmates because of religious beliefs can be reviewed in federal court, and 
that a claim based on such discipline should be entertained by federal courts); and Sewell 
v. Degelow, 291 F.2d 196 (4th Cir. 1961) (holding that federal prisoner’s claim for 
injunctive relief based on unconstitutional denial of religious freedom requires a hearing 
in federal court)). 
21 See Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 14, at 1847–49. 
22 Id. at 1849. 
23 42 U.S.C. 1983 (“Every person who, under color of [state law] . . . subjects . . . any . . . 
person . . . to the deprivation of any rights . . . secured by the Constitution and laws, shall 
be liable. . . .”). 
24 Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 14, at 1849. 
25 Id. at 1850. 
26 Dept. of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, Prisoner Petitions File in 
U.S. District Courts, 2000, with Trends 1980–2000, at 3 (Jan. 2002) [hereinafter DOJ 
Report]. 
27 Id. 
28 Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96–247, § 7(a)(1), 94 Stat. 
349, 352 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997–1997(j) (1996)). 
29 Id. at § 7(b)(1). 
30 Id. at § 7(a)(2). 
31 Id. at §7(c)(1). 
32 DOJ Report, supra note 26. 
33 Id. at 1. 
34 Id. at 3. 
35 Id. at 4, t. 3. 
36 Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Dec. 1998, 
at 2, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/doc/print/199812/prisons. 
37 Id.; See also, Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Globalisation and US Prison Growth: From 
Military Keynesianism to Post-Keynesian Militarism, 40 RACE & CLASS 171, 171–74 
(1999) (The growth in the prison population has been attributed to high crime rates and 
358 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
 
drug use, but also anti-Black racism and “the economic development and profit-
generating potential that prisons promise.” Ironically, there was a decline in the national 
crime rate as well as a decline in drug use among Americans in the 1980s and 1990s.). 
38 DOJ Report, supra note 26, at 9. 
39 See, e.g., Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 14, at 1855 (“[T]he two purposes of the 
Act—limiting the burden of inmate litigation and curtailing the micromanagement of 
prison suits . . . .”); see also Kermit Roosevelt III, Exhaustion Under the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act: The Consequence of Procedural Error, 52 EMORY L.J. 1771, 
1778 (2003) (“The PLRA provisions fell into two relatively distinct categories. The first 
group . . . [was] intended to ‘get the federal courts out of the business of running jails.’” 
The second group included “the provisions that target individual inmate suits and are 
intended to relieve courts from the alleged burden of frivolous litigation.” (quoting 
Benjamin v. Jacobson, 172 F.3d 144, 182 (2d Cir. 1999)). 
40 Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, American Const. Soc’y, Preserving the Rule of 
Law in America’s Prisons: The Case for Amending the Prison Litigation Reform Act, at 1 
(Mar. 2007) (citing Pub. L. No. 104–34, §§ 801–10, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-66 to -77 (Apr. 
26, 1996) (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 523; 18 U.S.C. §§ 3624, 3626; 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 
1915, 1915A; 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997–1997h)). It is also worth noting that Congress passed 
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (ADEPA) that same year which was 
intended to limit federal courts from delaying executions as they reviewed habeas corpus 
petitions; Harv. L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 14, at 1846. 
41 Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 117 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
42 Id. (citing 141 Cong. Rec. 27042 (Sept. 29, 1995)). 
43 Id. (citing 141 Cong. Rec. 27044 (Sept. 29, 1995)) (Senator Thurmond’s statement 
concerning the court’s discretion is suspicious, insofar as that the same supporters of the 
PLRA had issue with the amount of discretion that judges had in remedying certain 
violations prior to the passage of the act, i.e., “federal judge[s’] ability to issue broad 
remedial orders which proponents of reform viewed as effectively turning prison 
administration over to judges ‘for the indefinite future for the slightest reason.’”); Harv. 
L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 14 at 1854–55 (quoting 141 Cong. Rec. 26, 554 (1995) 
(statement of Sen. Abraham)). 
44 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (2008). 
45 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) (2008). 
46 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined 
in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered 
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.”). 
47 Robert Warring, Better Late Than Never?: A Faithful Interpretation of the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act’s Exhaustion Requirement Says No, 80 TEMP. L. REV. 365, 376 
(2007). 
48 Id. 
49 CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS & NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 6, at 6. 
50 DOJ Report, supra note 26. 
51 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–34. 
Keeping Jailers from Keeping the Keys to the Courthouse 359 
VOLUME 8 • ISSUE 1 • 2009 
 
52 Margo Schlanger, Inmate Litigation, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1555, 1644 (Apr. 2003) 
(“[T]he PLRA’s new decision standards have imposed new and very high hurdles so that 
even constitutionally meritorious cases are often thrown out of court.”). 
53 CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS & NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 6, at 6. 
54 Testimony for the House Judiciary Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland 
Security (Apr. 22, 2008) (statement of Coalition to Stop Abuse and Violence Everywhere 
(SAVE Coalition)) [hereinafter Save Coalition]. 
55 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). 
56 Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–34. 
57 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined 
in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered 
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.”). 
58 SCHLANGER & SHAY, supra note 40, at 5. 
59 Id. at 5–6. 
60 Id. at 6 (citing Hancock v. Payne, No. Civ.A.1.03CV671JMRJMR, 2006 WL 21751 
(S.D. Miss. Jan 4, 2006).  
61 Id. at 1. 
62 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (2008). 
63 Id. 
64 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e) (“No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner confined 
in a jail, prison, or other correctional facility, for mental or emotional injury suffered 
while in custody without a prior showing of physical injury.”). 
65 See Porter v. Nussle, 534 U.S. 516 (2002); Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731, 734 
(2001); Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006). 
66 SCHLANGER & SHAY, supra note 40, at 1. 
67 CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS & NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 6, at 37. 
68 Porter, 534 U.S. at 519–21. 
69 Id. at 521. 
70 Id. at 532. 
71 CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS & NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 6, at 37. 
72 Booth, 532 U.S. at 734. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. at 739. 
75 CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS & NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 6, at 37. 
76 Woodford, 548 U.S. at 83–84. 
77 Id. at 87. 
78 Id. at 86. 
79 Ngo v. Woodford, 403 F.3d 620, 622 (N.D. Cal. 2005), rev’d, 548 U.S. 81 (2006). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Woodford, 548 U.S. at 87. 
83 Id. at 84. 
84 Id. at 88. 
85 Id. at 90–91. 
86 Id. at 101–02. 




88 Id. at 88 (quoting McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969)). 
89 Id. (quoting Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1938)). 
90 Id. at 90 (quoting Pozo, 286 F.3d at 1024 (emphasis in original)). 
91 Id. (citing United States v. L.A. Tucker Truck Lines, Inc., 344 U.S. 33, 37 (1952) 
(emphasis added)). 
92 Id. at 93. 
93 Id. at 102. 
94 Id. at 89. 
95 Save Coalition, supra note 54, at app. 4. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 28 C.F.R. § 542.10(b) (2008). 
99 Woodford, 548 U.S. at 94 (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491–92 
(1973)). 
100 Andrea Jacobs, Prison Power Corrupts Absolutely: Exploring the Phenomenon of 
Prison Guard Brutality and the Need to Develop a System of Accountability, 41 CAL. W. 
L. REV. 277, 295 (2004). 
101 28 C.F.R. § 542 (2008). 
102 28 C.F.R. § 542.13 (2008). 
103 Id. at § 542.13(a) (2008). 
104 Id. 
105 Id. at § 542.14(b) (2008). 
106 Id. at § 542.17 (2008). 
107 Id. 
108 28 C.F.R. § 542 (2008). 
109 Id. at § 542.14(a) (2008). 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 See Brief for Jerome N. Frank Legal Servs. Org. of the Yale Law School as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Respondent, Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81 (2006) (No. 05-416) at 6–
13, 2006 WL 304573 [hereinafter Amicus Brief]. 
113 Id. 
114 See id. 
115 Save Coalition, supra note 54, at app. 4. 
116 American Civil Liberties Union, The Prison Litigation Reform Act Must be Fixed, 
(Apr. 22, 2008) available at http://www.aclu.org/prison/gen/34970prs20080422.html. 
117 Amicus Brief, supra note 112. 
118 Id. 
119 See id. 
120 Jones v. Bock, 549 U.S. 199 (2007). 
121 Id. at 212. 
122 Id. at 203. 
123 Id. at 218. 
124 Id. 
Keeping Jailers from Keeping the Keys to the Courthouse 361 
VOLUME 8 • ISSUE 1 • 2009 
 
125 Id. at 222. 
126 Id. at 221. 
127 CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS & NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 6, at 5. 
128 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h) (2006) (“[T]he term prisoner means any person incarcerated or 
detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated 
delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms and conditions of parole probation, 
pretrial release or diversionary program.”); 18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(5) (2007) (“[T]he term 
‘prison’ means any Federal, State, or local facility that incarcerates or detains juveniles or 
adults accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of 
criminal law.”); Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104–34 (“[A]ny 
action brought . . . by an adult convicted of a crime confined in any jail, prison, or other 
correctional facility. . . . ). 
129 Just Detention Int’l, Fact Sheet, Incarcerated Youth at Extreme Risk of Sexual Abuse, 




133 SCHLANGER & SHAY, supra note 40, at 3 n.18. 
134 Id. 
135 Minix v. Pazera, No. 1:04 CV 447 RM, 2005 WL 1799538 (N.D. Ind., July 27, 2005). 
136 Id. at 6. 
137 Id. at 7 (Federal jurisdiction was relinquished to the state courts, and the minor 
plaintiff was released from custody early.). 
138 Alexander S. v. Boyd, 876 F. Supp. 773, 790 (D.S.C. 1995); see also SCHLANGER & 
SHAY, supra note 40, at 4; Just Detention Int’l, Fact Sheet, Incarcerated Youth at 
Extreme Risk of Sexual Abuse (Mar. 2009), available at http://www.justdetention.org/en/ 
factsheets/Youth.pdf. 
139 THE COMM’N ON SAFETY AND ABUSE IN AMERICA’S PRISONS, CONFRONTING 
CONFINEMENT 84 (2006), available at: http://www.prisoncommission.org/pdfs/ 
Confronting_Confinement.pdf [hereinafter CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT]. 
140 DOJ Report, supra note 26, at 1. 
141 Woodford, 548 U.S. at 115. 
142 CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT, supra note 139, at 84. 
143 Id.. 
144 Schlanger, supra note52, at 1661–64. 
145 DOJ Report, supra note 26, at 4, t. 3. 
146 PEW CTR. ON THE STATES, ONE IN 100: BEHIND BARS IN AMERICA 5 (2008) 
[hereinafter PEW CTR.]. 
147 Id. at 17. 
148 Id. at 9. 
149 CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT, supra note 139, at 26. 
150 Id. 
151 Id.  
152 Id. at 27. 
153 PEW CTR., supra note 146, at 13. 
362 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
 
154 Schlanger, supra note 52, at 1650. 
155 Schlanger & Shay, supra note 40, at 3. 
156 Woodford, 548 U.S. at 93. 
157 CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT, supra note 139, at 92. 
158 SCHLANGER & SHAY, supra note 40, at 10. 
159 See id. 
160 Id. at 9. 
161 Giovanna Shay & Johanna Kalb, More Stories of Jurisdiction-Stripping and Executive 
Power: Interpreting the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 291, 
319 n.219 (2007). 
162 Id. 
163 CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT, supra note 139, at 92. 
164 Human Rights Watch, No Equal Justice: The Prison Litigation Reform Act in the 
United States, 12 (2009) (citing Sanders v. Bachus, 2008 WL 54228571, at 5 (W.D. 
Mich. 2008)). 
165 American Civil Liberties Union, supra note 116. 
166 Jacobs, supra note 100, at 296. 
167 Schlosser, supra note 36, at 3. 
168 Amicus Brief, supra note 112. 
169 Schlosser, supra note 36, at 3. 
170 CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT, supra note 139 at 43. 
171 See CTR. FOR CONST. RIGHTS & NAT’L LAWYERS GUILD, supra note 6 at 66. 
172 Save Coalition, supra note 54, at app. 6. 
173 Id. 
174 Id. 
175 SCHLANGER & SHAY, supra note 40, at 10. 
176 Woodford, 548 U.S. at 89–90. 
177 Id. at 94 (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491–92 (1973). 
178 Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2007, H.R. 4109, 110th Cong. 
179 THE 2009 CRIMINAL JUSTICE TRANSITION COALITION, SMART ON CRIME: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE NEXT ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS 96 (2008) 
[hereinafter RECOMMENDATIONS]. 
180 Shay & Kalb, supra note 161, at 328–29. 
181 Prison Abuse Remedies Act of 2007, H.R. 4109, 110th Cong. at § (a). 
182 See Coalition to Stop Abuse and Violence Everywhere (SAVE Coalition), Testimony 
for the House Judiciary Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism and Homeland Security (Apr. 22, 
2008). 
183 See id.; see also Margo Schlanger & Giovanna Shay, American Const. Soc’y, 
Preserving the Rule of Law in America’s Prisons: The Case for Amending the Prison 
Litigation Reform Act, at 10, n.56 (Mar. 2007). 
184 Robert M. A. Johnson, Chair, Criminal Justice Section, American Bar Association, 
[Resolution to Amend the PLRA], February 12, 2007, available at 
http://www.savecoalition.org/americanbar.html, last visited Nov. 2, 2008.  
Keeping Jailers from Keeping the Keys to the Courthouse 363 
VOLUME 8 • ISSUE 1 • 2009 
 
185 Id. (citing Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (holding that a state statute requiring 
that state and local officials be notified of a claim within 120 days after the incident on 
which it is based is unenforceable in a Section 1983 suit). 
186 See id. 
187 RECOMMENDATIONS, supra note 179. 
188 Woodford, 548 U.S. at 120 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Shay & Kalb, supra note 161 at; 
CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT, supra note 139, at 87. 
189 CONFRONTING CONFINEMENT, supra note 139, at 87. 
190 Johnson, supra note 184. 
191 Id. 
192 See Warring, supra note 47, at 377 (citing CRIPA §§ 7(b)(2) (A)-(E) and (c)). 
193 Johnson, supra note 184. 
194 Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, § 7(b)(2)(A). 
195 Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, § 7 (b)(2)(B). 
196 Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, § 7 (b)(2)(C). 
197 Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, § 7 (b)(2)(D). 
198 Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. No. 96-247, § 7 (b)(2)(E). 
199 See Woodford, 548 U.S at 94 (quoting Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 491–92, 
(1973)). 
200 Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 651 (1966). 
201 See Woodford, 548 U.S. at 122–23 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
202 Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 821 (1977); see also Woodford, 548 U.S. at 122 
(Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351, 346 (1996)). 
203 U.S. CONST., amend. XIV, § 1. 
204 Turner v. Safely, 482 U.S. 78, 84 (1987) (quoting Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S., at 
405–06 (1974). 
205 Id. at 87. 
206 Nev. Dept. of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 729 (2003). 
207 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530 (1997). 
208 Id. 
209 Id. 
210 Warring, supra note 47, at 389. (This assertion, however, seems to undermine the 
stated intended purpose of the PLRA, i.e., to reduce the number of frivolous lawsuits 
filed by prisoners. See id. at 368. The author goes on to say that “barring late grievances 
actually furthers Congress’s intended goal of freeing up resources from frivolous suits to 
be used on meritorious ones.” Id. at 389. By this rationale, the converse can also be 
argued: that barring late grievances frees up resources from meritorious suits to be used 
on frivolous ones, if the exhaustion requirement is “unrelated to the merit (or lack 
thereof) of the prisoner’s claim.” Id.). 
211 Save Coalition, supra note 54, at 3. 
212 SCHLANGER & SHAY, supra note 40, at 9. 
213 As mentioned in Section III above. 
214 National Prison Rape Elimination Comm’n, National Prison Rape Elimination 
Comm’n Report 1 (Jun. 2009). 
215 Id. 
364 SEATTLE JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE 
STUDENT SCHOLARSHIP 
 
216 Id. at 10. 
217 Id. 
218 National Prison Rape Elimination Comm’n, Standards for the Prevention, Detection, 
Response, and Monitoring of Sexual Abuse in Adult Prisons and Jails 35 (Jun. 2009). 
219 Id. 
220 Id. 
221 PEW CTR., supra note 146. 
